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L STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code sections 78A-3-102(3)(j) and
78A-4-103(2)(j) as this is a direct appeal from a final judgment of the Third District
Court, which was transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did the district court apply the correct standard to consider Appellant Jeremy
Warnick's ("Warnick")1 fee request when it adopted a "flexible and reasoned" approach
and considered the Nielson factors, and did the trial court act within its sound discretion
when it concluded that based on the fact neither party prevailed on its substantive claims,
and a consideration of the Nielson factors, "neither party is a prevailing party" and/or is
"entitled to an award of fees."
III.

STANDARD OF RE VIEW

An abuse of discretion standard of review applies because Warnick is challenging
the district court's conclusion that neither party prevailed. It is well established a district
court's determination as to which, if any, party prevailed is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard:
Which party is the prevailing party is an appropriate question for the trial
court. This question depends, to a large measure, on the context of each
case, and, therefore, it is appropriate to leave this determination to the
sound discretion of the trial court. We therefore review the trial court's
determination as to who was the prevailing party under an abuse of
discretion standard.
Warnick, together with Martin Tanner, David Thayne and Heritage
Communications, were the defendants in the action before the district court (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Defendants"). Only Warnick went to trial on the underlying
case and only Warnick brings this appeal.
1
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R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, «[[ 255 40 P.3d 1119 (emphasis added); see also
Carlson Distrib. Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C, 2004 UT App. 227, f 16, 95 P.3d
1171 ("[w]hether a party is a prevailing party in an action is a decision left to the sound
discretion of the trial court and reviewed for an abuse of discretion."); Larry J. Coet
Chevrolet v. Labrum, 2008 UT App. 69, % 16, 180 P.3d 765 (same); Neffv. Neff, 2011 UT
6, Tf 74, 247 P.3d 380 (finding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding neither
party prevailed where parties filed competing claims with limited success on claims
filed). Here, the district court denied Warnick's request for fees because it concluded
"neither party is a prevailing party."

(R. 1572-1581.)

Accordingly, the abuse of

discretion standard is the appropriate standard of review.
Despite Warnick's attempts to claim otherwise, the correctness standard of review
only applies where the issue on appeal is a determination regarding the applicability of
the statute or contract conferring the legal right to collect fees. See e.g. Hooban v.
Unicity Int'l, Inc., 2009 UT App. 287,fflf6-11, 220 P.3d 485 (reviewing for correctness
determination that third party could not recover fees under Utah's reciprocal fee statute
because it was not a party to the contract containing the attorney fee provision); Chase v.
Scott, 2001 UT App. 404, ffif 8 & 11-17, 38 P.3d 1001 (reviewing for correctness
determination that defendant who successfully argued against plaintiffs claim of
rescission could recover fees under reciprocal fee statute where contract term allowed one

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 provides a Court may award fees to either party
that prevails where the terms of the parties' agreement allows only one party to recover
such fees. This will be referred to hereinafter as the "reciprocal fee statute."
2 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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party to recover fees to "enforce agreement"); Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, ^f 1023, 160 P.3d 1041 (reviewing for correctness the district court's determination that the
reciprocal fee statute did not apply where the guaranty that contained the attorney fee
provision was rescinded).
A determination that "neither party is a prevailing party" is not a determination
regarding the applicability of the reciprocal fee statute or terms of the agreement. Indeed,
in R.T. Nielson, the Utah Supreme Court specifically recognized this point. There the
court reviewed for correctness the district court's finding that the modified agreement
contained an attorney fee provision giving the prevailing party a right to recover its fees,
but reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard the district court's finding the
plaintiff was the prevailing party. R.T. Nielson, 2002 UT 11 at ^f 16 & 25.
Despite Warnick's attempts to manipulate the language of the issue on appeal to
persuade the Court the correctness standard of review applies—it is clear the question
presented for review is the district court's conclusion that neither party prevailed.
Neither should the Court be fooled by Warnick's mischaracterization of the case as
simply a determination of whether "Warnick owed [A&K] fees:"

(App. Br. 13.)

Warnick did not just defend himself against A&K's claim to recover amounts due and
owing to A&K; he brought affirmative claims against A&K seeking more than $1 million
in damages. A&K wholly prevailed on those claims, which were summarily dismissed
when the Court determined several essential elements were lacking.

This was an

essential fact in the district court's determination that neither party prevailed and that
neither party is entitled to an award of fees.
3
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The abuse of discretion standard, unquestionably, is the applicable standard to
review the district court's determination that neither party prevailed.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. Section 78B-5-826: A court may award costs and attorney fees to
either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written
contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover
attorney fees.
V. STATEMENT OF CASE
From approximately December 2005 until December 2006, Appellee Anderson &
Karrenberg ("A&K") served as legal counsel to Warnick, Martin Tanner, David Thayne
and Heritage Communications, representing them in connection with claims against an
entity, Co-Connect, and in other matters. (R.0002, lj 8; R.0012, ^ 1 & R.0039, Tj 1.) At
the outset of this representation, A&K and Warnick entered into an engagement
agreement, governing the terms of the representation, and including an attorney fee
provision allowing A&K to recover the fees it incurs in enforcing the agreement. (App.
Br. 11; R.1515-1516, & Ex. A (R. 1526-1527); R.1399, lj 1.) The representation naturally
ended when the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement resolving their disputes with
Co-Connect. (R.0328, Tf 6.)
In early 2008, A&K filed a Complaint with the Third District Court seeking to
recover attorney fees A&K believed were due and owing from Warnick, Tanner, Thayne
4 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and Heritage Communications, for the legal services it provided.

(R.0001-0010.)

Warnick responded to the Complaint by filing an Answer and bringing two affirmative
claims; one for frai id ai id 1 nisrepresentatioi 1 ai id 01 le foi bad faith (R 0011 0018, Y[j 21 27.)

Both claims alleged, primarily, that A&K induced Warnick to enter into the

engagement agreement by representing the legal fees would not exceed $20,000, and
soughi

< i\ •

-

•-.•

:, damages. (R 0011 0018, ffif 21-27.) A&K summarily

defeated both ol these claims on their merits throi lgh a n lotion foi si immai y ji ldgi i lei it
The district court in granting A&K's motion found "there were several elements missing
from the fraud claim, the presently existing fact, the reasonable reliance upon it, and
realh flic qiii'Sliun ui injurs ,HH( damages." (F "^""-i* r*w; • <• .j. ;

j... ,

<\ K

Summ. ].y.) It also found the bad faith claim "ha[d] not been made out" because "[t]here
[was] no showing that the plaintiffs filed this action in bad faith." (R.0567-0569; Hrg.
Tr. 213-2! 1 ( / \ &K 's Mot Si u i n :t i II) )

Fanner f v,;

brought the same affirmative claims, which we*

:

^-

. a.'u.^i identical Answer and
\

• dismissed oi i the sai i ic

grounds. (R.0038-0044.)4

0

I he transcript of the hearing on A&K's Motion for Summary Judgment was
received into the district court's record on June 9, 2010. (See Docket, attached to the
addendum hereto as Ex. A.) The transcript, however, was simply enclosed loosely in the
district court files, and not given a record designation by the Clerk of the Coiirt.
Accordingly, citation is made directly to that transcript.
David Thayne and Heritage Communications did not participate in the litigation.
David Thayne was served by alternative service and a default judgment was entered for
the full amount A&K claimed. (R.0084-0086; R.0114 0115;' R.0180-0182.) Heritage
Communications was served but failed to respond and a default judgment was also
entered against it for the full amount claimed, ^ n n u o n r p n i ^ o i ^ ^
5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A&K later resolved its claims against Tanner, and the case proceeded to trial on
A&K's claims against Warnick. At trial the jury found there was an agreement between
A&K and Warnick to pay attorney fees, and rejected Warnick's claim there was a term
imposing a $20,000 cap on the attorney fees to be paid under that agreement. (R.13991400, Yl 1 & 2.) The jury, however, found Warnick did not breach his obligation to pay
A&K, resulting in no judgment for A&K. (R.1400, ^6.)
After conclusion of the trial, Warnick sought an award of fees pursuant to the
attorney fee provision contained in the parties' engagement agreement and Utah's
reciprocal fee statute. After receiving extensive briefing on the issue, the district court
issued a ruling that ultimately concluded neither party prevailed. (R. 1572-1581.) In
reaching this determination, the district court considered the fact that neither party
prevailed on their substantive claims, and determined based on that and a consideration of
the Nielson factors that neither party prevailed and neither party was entitled to an award
of fees. (R. 1579-1580.) In an attempt to obtain a different result, Warnick appeals to this
Court, incorrectly claiming the district court somehow misapplied the law in reaching its
conclusion.
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should not disturb the district court's conclusion that "neither party is a
'prevailing party'" and that "neither party is entitled to an award of fees." (R.1579.)
Under the reciprocal fee statute, a court may award fees if it determines one party
prevailed, but the terms of the parties' agreement only allows the other party to collect
fees. It is well recognized that whether a party did in fact prevail depends, to a large
6
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measure, on the context of each case, and therefore, it is appropriate to leave this
determination to the sound discretion of the trial court. Here, the district court reached
the cot lclusioi 1 that i leitl lei party pi e\ ailed aftei pi opei ly adoptii lg a "' "flexible mu
reasoned" approach and considering the Nielson factors, which this Court and the Utah
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized is the standard for determining if a party did
indeed prevail.
Moreover, an exan lii latioi :i of tl le I ot n factors M
;, n n iciated ii i R.l Nielson and
recognized as appropriate considerations in making the prevailing party determination,
demonstrate the district court did not abuse its discretion in reaching the conclusion
neither party prevailed

I i: le first factor tl le language of the attoi ney fee provision in the

parties' agreement, supports the district court's approach of considering ah the f claims in making its determination. The second, third and fourth factors that consider the
aims and counterclaims brought b\ the parties, the importance of those
claims in the context of the law si lit as a. wl lole ai id tl i z do

••

.

.r;.- i *

awarded in connection with the parties' claims all clearly support the district court's
conclusion no one prevailed. The parties each lost their substantive claims (or stated
anothei w a\ , prevailed ii i del eatii lg the clain is agaii ist thei i i)„ vvhicl i were of at i east s :JI lal
significance in the context of the case as a whole: A&K only sought $70,000 in damages,
but defeated claims seeking more than $1 million in damages. Moreover, A&K's success
in defeating Warnick's claims was necessary for it to pursue its claims.
In contrast, the arguments raised by War:M rI. . iM

-

^ ^ ?-.. •

- :i -

its discretion or otherwise erred in reaching its conclusion. Warnick's argument that the
7
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reciprocal fee statute applies in this circumstance, and the argument that he is only
claiming attorney fees for the claim on which he prevailed (and for which he was
represented), are not relevant to this Court's review of the conclusion that neither party
prevailed. These points only become relevant i/a district court concludes one party did
in fact prevail: If there is a prevailing party the applicability of the reciprocal fee statute
becomes relevant as it may confer a right to recover on the prevailing party if the
language of the agreement does not, and the details of the claims for which fees are
sought becomes relevant as it dictates the amount of fees to award as a prevailing party
can only recover fees for claims on which it prevailed. These arguments, however, are
wholly irrelevant to the district court's analysis of whether one party did indeed prevail.
The Court can also disregard any argument that Warnick in fact prevailed because
he prevailed on the "gravamen" of his claims, and those claims should have been pled as
affirmative defenses. Warnick did not prevail on the "gravamen" of his claims. Those
claims and his primary defense to the breach of contract claim were based on a claim that
the attorney fee agreement contained a term capping A&K's fees at $20,000.

As

demonstrated by the jury verdict form, Warnick wholly failed to establish that fact and
that claim. Likewise, Warnick's claims sought more than $1 million in damages and
were not and should not be treated as affirmative defenses.
Finally, even if this Court were to find the district court did abuse its discretion or
otherwise erred in concluding neither party prevailed, such error is harmless. As a law
firm representing itself, A&K is not entitled to collect its fees and Warnick was never at

8
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risk of having to pay A&K's attorney fees. Accordingly, the reciprocal fee statute should
not even apply in this circumstance.

A.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT NEITHER PARTY
PREVAILED SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED BECAUSE THE DISTRICT
COURT APPLIED A "FLEXIBLE AND REASONED" APPROACH AND
ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION.
1.

I he District Court Applied a "Flexible and Reasoned" Approach as
Required to Determine Neither Party Prevailed.

The district court, adopting a "flexible and reasoned'' approach, concluded neither
party prevailed. This finding should not be disturbed. The reciprocal fee statute permits
a couri lo ;i\\:ii"cl fees in cilher part\ ilial prevails in a i:r\ ii aitinn ti as here, the terms of
the parties' agreement allows only one party to recover fees. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5826 (emphasis added).
U1lether a party is the prevailing party depends in large measure on the context of
each case.

Carlson, 2004 U I \pp ? 1 " <il f| ^7

\ct onlinrh

dislnci • • >t11r nit

instructed to adopt a "flexible and reasoned" approach to determining which party
prevailed

Larry ,I Coet Chevrolet v. Labrum, 2008 UT App. 69, ^ 23, 180 P.3d 765;

Olsen v. Lund, l^

•

J>D3,

]|7, 24<« I' h\

"1 clatim.1 "|u|ur courts have

developed a 'flexible and reasoned approach' for determining which party has emerged
the 'comparative winner'")
consider

an Ma i- "thei ih

"Under this approach, [a] trial court may appropriately
contract! lal language, (2) the number <•• elaims,

counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., brougl it b\ tl le parties (3) ti le ii i lportance or tne claims
relative to each other and their significance in the context of the lawsuit considered as a
9
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whole, and (4) the dollar amounts attached to and awarded in connection with the various
claims." Larry J. Coet, 2008 UT App. 69 at % 23; Carlson, 2004 UT App. 227 at If 37
citing R.T. Nielson, 2002 UT 11 at ^f 25 (and referring to these factors as the "Nielson
factors"). Analysis of these factors allows "a case-by-case evaluation by the trial court,
and flexibility to handle circumstances where both, or neither, parties may be
considered to have prevailed'" R.T. Nielson, 2002 UT 11 at ^ 25 (emphasis added); Neff,
2011UT6atTJ70.
Warnick oversimplifies the district court's analysis when he describes it as simply
counting the captions in the pleadings. (App. Br. 18.) It is clear from the district court's
ruling, which includes a lengthy discussion of the applicable legal standards, that the
court carefully considered the appropriate standard and then adopted a "flexible and
reasoned" approach and considered these factors in making its determination. (R.15791580.) It is also clear from the district court's use of a table to detail the claims on which
each party prevailed, that it found significant the fact that neither party prevailed on its
substantive claims and that it considered the claims of at least equal significance. See e.g.
A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, f 30, 94 P.3d 270.
Indeed, in A.K. & R. Whipple, the Utah Supreme Court found "although lacking in
detail [the] district court's explanation of its rationale was adequate" where it simply
stated it was of the opinion there was essentially a "draw" because plaintiff was seeking
$13,000 and defendant was seeking $25,000, and the net recovery was only $527. The
court went on to find that it was "apparent from the trial court's reasoning that it believed
the defendant's net recovery of only two percent (2%) of its claimed damages was
10
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insufficient to make it the successful party." A.K & R. Whipple, 2 0 0 4 U T 47 at % 28.
Likewise, it is apparent here that the district court found significant both parties failure on
their substanti\ e clain is,, ai id coi isidered tl le clain is of at least equal sigi lificance.
Because the district court correctly applied a "flexible and reasoned" a p p r o m In In
find neither party prevailed, and because it is appropriate to leave this determination to
the sou.! id discretioi i of the trial court, the district court's finding should not be disturbed.
2.

A Consideration of the Nielson Factors Demonstrates the District
Court Acted Within Its Discretion When It Concluded Neither Party
Prevailed.
a The Parties' Prevailed or Lost on an Equal Number of Claims of At
Least Equal Significance.

The parties prevailed or lost oi i ai i eqi lal i n in iber of claims of at least «
significance, showing the district court did not exceed its discretion when it concluded
neither party prevailed. Under the second and third Nielson factors a district court may
consider Ilk" number "I ( h i n t s and i "iinlen lainr

hotiHii b\ the parties, and the

importance of those claims relative to each other and their significance in ihc

>MI JI

the litigation as a whole. R.T. Nielson Co., 2 0 0 2 U T 11 at f 25.
Again, iii 4.K. & R. Whipple where the plaintiff and defendant each were partially
successful in prosecuting their claims a n d partially si ic: cessfi il ii i ^ defending agaii ist tl le
claims against them, the district court declared a "draw," determining neither party
prevailed despite the fact a net judgment was issued in favor o f one o f the defendants.
2 0 0 4 U T 17 jf «' ^

| |K Utah Suprenu < otiil Iniiiul llns * ouil u m e e f h afilmied ihe

district court's finding o f a "draw." Id. at ^f 30.
11

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This case presents an even more classic example of a circumstance where neither
party prevailed because both parties failed to recover anything on their affirmative claims
(or, put another way, both parties wholly prevailed on the claims against them).
Moreover, it was appropriate for the district court to treat at least equally A&K's success
in defeating the claims against it. A&K only sought $70,000 in damages, but defeated
claims seeking more than $1 million in damages. Further, to even be able to proceed
with its breach of contract claim, it was essential for A&K to defeat Warnick's claims. In
light of these facts, it is clear the court acted within its discretion when it concluded
neither party prevailed.
b. The Dollar Amounts Attached to the Parties' Claims Also Show the
District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Concluded
Neither Party Prevailed.
The fourth Nielson factor permits consideration of the dollar amounts attached to
and awarded in connection with the parties' claims, which also supports the district
court's conclusion. Recent Utah decisions are instructive this point. For example, in
Olsen v. Lund, this Court noted the determination of who received the net judgment is
only the starting point when determining the prevailing party, and that the amounts
sought by either party, and a balancing of those amounts proportionate to the amount
actually recovered, should also be considered. Olsen, 2010 UT App. 353 at ^f 7. In that
case, where the plaintiffs brought a claim for approximately $20,000 and recovered only
$750, the defendants were considered the "comparative winners" and thus the prevailing
party for purposes of the attorney fee provision. Id. at Ifll 13-15.
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Similarly, in A.K. & 11 Whipple the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's finding of a "draw" despite the fact the defendant received a net recovery of $527,
because the plaintiff" had recovered sortie bin niol all, « I liie damages it sought a •.: -he
defendant recovered some, but not all, of the damages it sought on its coi inte i clain :i - i K
& R. Whipple, 2004 UT 47 at f 30. See also Neff, 2011 UT 6 at ^ 70-74 (where the Utah
Suni.-ni',

, -•

aaTi'PMny th c district court, found neither party prevailed because both

parties successfully defeated claims ai id a voided liabilities ii i excess of $ I n lillioi i and
each party made similar minimal recoveries in comparison to the damages claimed.)
Here neither party made any recovery on any of their claims, which alone shows
tl le district coi irt did i lot exceed its discretioi i w hei i ; u

- • • -. . her party prevailed.

Notably, however, a comparison of the dollar amounts shows A&K ::\ '••
larger monetary liability than Warnick, making it, arguably, the "comparative winner:"
B> 1:1 le tin le of trial V&K's claim was for approximately $ 70,000, in comparison to
Warnick's claims whicl I sen lgl it in excess of $ 1 i i lillion ii i dai i mges.
The Language of the Attorney Fee Provision Does Not Limit the
District Court from Considering All the Parties' Claims in Making
Its Prevailing Party Determination.
The lii st Nk " I s< : »/ i f actor tl le langi.ia.ge of the attoi ney fee pi o\ isioi I ii l the parties'
agreement, is largely irrelevant because the provision simply identifies the fees which can
be recovered. It does not direct a court how to reach the determination of which, if any,
party prevailed. ' I he district coi n L, therefore, was free to consider all the parties' claims
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and the facts it deemed most relevant in making its determination that neither party
prevailed and/or was entitled to fees.5
B.

THE ARGUMENTS RAISED BY WARNICK DO NOT SHOW THE
DISTRICT COURT EXCEEDED ITS DISCRETION OR OTHERWISE
ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED NEITHER PARTY PREVAILED.
1.

The Applicability of the Reciprocal Fee Statute and the Specific Fees
Sought Are Not Relevant to the District Court's Determination Neither
Party Prevailed.

The Court can ignore Warnick's arguments that the reciprocal fee statute applies
in this circumstance, or that Warnick's request for fees are limited to the claims on which
he prevailed, as they can demonstrate no error on the part of the district court. A district
court determines which, if any, party prevailed by adopting a "flexible and reasoned"
approach and considering the Nielson factors, supra § A, not by considering whether the
reciprocal fee statute applies. Here, the district court denied Warnick's request for fees

5

Notably, a balancing of A&K's success on the fraud and misrepresentation claim
against Warnick's success in defeating the breach of contract claim was especially
appropriate because the terms of the parties' agreement allows recovery of fees for both
those claims. The agreement allows recovery for fees "incurred in the enforcement of
[the] agreement." A&K's defense of the fraud and misrepresentation claim, which
sought to invalidate the agreement, was clearly pursuant to A&K's enforcement of the
Agreement; see e.g. Chase, 2001 UT App. 404 at fflf 11-17 (finding defending against a
claim for rescission was "litigation . . to enforce the agreement" and clearly within the
attorney fee provision that allowed for recovery of fees "in the event of litigation to
enforce the Contract."). See also Larry J. Coet, 2008 UT App. 69 at ^ 2 n.2 (granting
defendant attorney fees for defeating plaintiffs breach of contract claim and prevailing
on its own fraud and misrepresentation claim where the parties' agreement provided for
recovery "in the event any action is taken or brought by either party concerning [the]
Agreement."). Accordingly, A&K is just as entitled to collect fees for successfully
defeating the fraud and misrepresentation claim—had it not represented itself pro se (see
Infra § C)—as Warnick is for defending the breach of contract claim. However, because
the district court determined neither party prevailed, neither party can collect fees.
14
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because it found "neither party is a prevailing party''—not because it found the fee statute
did not apply. Accordingly, the Court can disregard much of Warnick's appellate brief,
whicl 1 sh npl> discusses tl ic applicability of tl ic i eciproc al fee stati ite. as it is not relevant
to the issue before this Court.6
Likewise, Warnick puts the cart before the horse when he argues that he is entitled
to UK attorney fees requested because they are limited to the defense of A&K's claims
and not prosecii!i<»n of his counterchiim1

I'IIMI

fael nn|\ become relc\am // 1 he i«mnl

makes a determination that a party did indeed prevail and is entitled to collect fees.
Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 94 P.3d 193, 203 (Utah 2004) (requiring separatioii of
recoverable in<f unit ivecn enibie ices because llu pi wailing ,

- »>nr

\u.-.

tn

recover fees permitted under the terms of the contract or statute;. ilk \'^\r- - <>•.'- :ic
not make this determination and Warnick is not entitled to collect any fees. Accordingly,
Warnick"s arguments thai he is only claiming fees ior in, period he was represented and
the claims on which tic (Hv\atl'ccl laiiill ilu n cunipaic in. hihlc Jcmon^li .il HIL IIIIM:
points) are wholly irrelevant to this Court's review of the determination that neither party
prevailed, and can and should be ignored.

Notably, Warnick's repeated reference to entitlement to recover attorney fees
under the reciprocal fee statute is equally misguided. (App. Br. 15-20.) The reciprocal
fee statute merely permits a court to award fees to either party that prevailed where a
written agreement confers that right on only one party. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826.
See also Bilanzich v. LonettU 2007 UT 26, ^ 14, 160 P.2d 1041. It does not, as the tenor
of Warnick's argument suggests, create any independent right to collect attorney fees if
there is no attorney fee provision in the parties' agreement.
15
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2.

The Court Can Disregard Any Argument that Warnick in Fact
Prevailed.

The Court can disregard Warnick's argument that he in fact prevailed because
A&K was not successful on any of its claims, and he was successful in convincing the
jury he owed A&K nothing. (See e.g. App. Br. 10 & 13.) It would be error and an abuse
of discretion if the district court did as Warnick suggests, and simply consider the claims
on which Warnick prevailed, ignoring the fact A&K prevailed on both of Warnick's
claims. (See supra § A (discussing at length the fact that Utah appellate courts have
directed district courts to consider the relative successes of the parties' claims when
determining which, if any, party prevailed).)
The Court can also disregard Warnick's claims that, although he did not prevail on
his claims, he prevailed on the "gravamen" of his claims, and that those claims should
have been pled as affirmative defenses and should be treated as such. (See e.g. App. 16
& 18.) First, Warnick did not prevail on the "gravamen" of his claims. Throughout the
litigation Warnick asserted there had been a representation that A&K's attorney fees
would not exceed $20,000. (See e.g. R. 0011-0018, lfl| 21-27; R.0262-0272; R.0321 &
R.0327, If 4 & response; R286-296; R. 1399-1400.) This was the basis for both the fraud
and misrepresentation claim and the bad faith claim, and the primary defense to A&K's
breach of contract claim. (R.0011-0018, Iffl 21-27; R.1399-1400.) As clearly shown by
the jury verdict form, Warnick was wholly unsuccessful in establishing this fact and
ultimately that claim. (R.1399,^2.)

16

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Second, Warnick sought more than $1 million in damages on his claims and they
should not be treated as affirmative defenses. (R.0015-0018.) Warnick's attempt to hide
behh id a claii i i • :>i " inartfi il pleading is ii lac •ci u ate

( \ pp Bi 11 ( \ 1 iei e "Vv arnick ai g;i ies

that "[i]f more artfully pled, [his claims] would have been affirmative defenses"). B y
making such argument, Warnick ignores the reality that there is no affirmative defense of
"KM 1 h u k ~ •:

* i: * * v A\ *:rMu;ive defen ^ .*i );\mc . -^ misrepresentation requires a

different showing of damages than a similar claim for fraud and misrepresentation * I lie
Court should not ignore reality and allow Warnick to recast his claims as affirmative
defenses just because it is now convenient for his attorney fee request.
i an iHuiipl hi bttfsKT il

wi null In*, i lainiN v u v in iiui iifliniiiiiiu

defenses, Warnick misrepresents in his Statement o f Facts "that the trial court reasoned
that Warnick's counterclaim w a s no different than his 5 th , (ih nul 7 th affirmative
defenses." ( \ p | i l!i I I i" I lit; district m i n i n u d e iiu ^ u l i finding—it entered judgment
on those claims because Warnick failed to establish several essential i - ^ ^ni

7

ho* > is

See e.g. Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 122 P.3d 556, 559-60 (Utah 2005)
(discussing the elements necessary to establish "bad faith" and o f collect attorney fees
under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 for bringing a claim in "bad faith").
8
In J. D. Daniels v. Coleman, 169 S.E. 2 d 593, 596-98 (S.C. 1969) t h e South
Carolina Supreme Court, applying similar elements for fraud as Utah, found plaintiffs
had not established a claim for fraud because the evidence presented was only sufficient
to establish t h e damage element foi an affirmative defense o f fraud, n o t t h e actual
pecuniary damages element necessary for a claim for fraud.
Notably, the portions o f the record cited by Warnick to support this assertion do
not show the district coi irt made this finding.
17
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fraud and misrepresentation claim and his bad faith claim.10 (R.0567-0569; Hrg. Tr. 2021(A&K'sMot. Summ.J.).)
Finally, Martin Tanner, a codefendant in this action, is trained as a lawyer in Utah
and is familiar with and participates in preparing legal documents.
R.0294-0296.)

(R.0268-0270;

Throughout the litigation, Warnick and Tanner filed almost identical

pleadings, including identical counterclaims. (See e.g. R.0011-0018-R.0044.) Warnick's
suggestion that he should not be held to the same standard as other parties merely
because he was acting pro se is not only wrong,11 but is especially inappropriate here,
where Warnick and Tanner were clearly cooperating on legal strategy.
The district court was uniquely in a position to observe these facts and other
details of this litigation. Accordingly, in the absence of any showing of an abuse of

10

In granting A&K's Motion for Summary Judgment on both Warnick's claims,
the district court expressly stated:
Having reviewed this matter, I believe that the position taken by the
plaintiff is the correct position. There [are] several elements missing
[from] the fraud claim, the presently existing fact, the reasonable reliance
upon it, and really the question of injury and damages. So I believe there
has not been a claim made out for fraud here by the defendants.
The bad faith claim / believe also has not been made out. There is no
showing that the plaintiffs filed this action in bad faith, so I'm going to
grant the motion for summary judgment as to those two counterclaims.
(Hrg. Tr. 20-21 (A&K's Mot. Summ. J.))
11

In Golden Meadows Properties, LC v. Strand, 2010 UT App. 257, If 3, 241 P.3d
375, this Court rejected the^ro se litigant's argument that he should have been granted
more leniency or given the opportunity to correct his errors finding "[a] party who
represents himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any
qualified member of the bar."
18
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discretion (or any other error), which Warnick has not and cannot show, the finding that
neither party prevailed should not be disturbed.
C.

EVEN IF rHE DISTRICT COURT HAD ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DETERMINING NEITHER PARTY PREVAILED, THE ERROR WOULD
HAVE BEEN HARMLESS.
Esven assuming arguendo that the district court erred in determining neither party

prev ailed, w hid i it did 1 lot the error was harmless because this is not a case whik Hie
reciprocal fee statute evei i applies, II is wd! ivcoimi/ol the purpose of the statute i1 in
6

"creat[e] a level playing field' [by] allowing both parties to recover fees where only one

party may assert such a right under contract

" and that a district court has discretion ~

to apph ihe sfattifc, NNIUMV ;ippmprkik\ in iiirllit.T that purpose Bih inzich v I -orient 2( )07
UT 26, «[ 18, 160 P.3d 1041 (discussing section 78-27-56.5, renumbered as section 78B5-826). This Court, however, has warned district courts not to apply the statute and
aw-Arcces to a prevailing party where there is no unequal risk of exposure to fees. See
Hooban, 2009 b I

"- < //.• i, . <u * ::n<>. M ••'?/ • • •

'

;

• '

UT 2, Yl 76-7, 201 P.3d 966 ("emphasizing that attorney fees may be awarded under
section 7 -sis- -S. n ,\ hen there is 'an unequal risk of contractual liability for attorney fees'
I 111

111111112

lll.ll
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|

(CC*

hi

(I

prevailing party when no such unequal risk exists" (emphasis added).)

~ A grant of fees under the reciprocal fee statute is discretionary. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-5-826 (stating "[a] court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that
prevails in a civil action
" (emphasis added)); see also Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT
26. f 17, 160 P.2d 1041 ("the language of the statute is ilot mandatory but allows courts
to exercise discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs").
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This is exactly the type of case where the statute should not apply. Warnick was
never at risk of having to pay A&K's fees because A&K, as a law firm representing itself
in a collection action, could never recover its fees regardless of the result of the litigation.
See Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1375 (Utah
1996) (finding a law firm does not "incur" fees when it uses its own attorneys in a
collection action and, therefore, was not entitled to recover attorney fees in its pro se
collection action). Accordingly, even if the district court had abused its discretion (or
otherwise erred) in finding neither party prevailed, the error would have been harmless
because the statute does not apply and Warnick is not entitled to an award of fees.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The district court is in the best position to appreciate the particular facts and
circumstances of this case and to determine, based on those facts, if one party did indeed
prevail. After adopting a "flexible and reasoned" approach, and considering the Nielson
factors, as directed by this Court, the district court concluded neither A&K, nor Warnick,
prevailed. Warnick cannot show the district court abused its discretion (or otherwise
erred) in reaching that conclusion, and the district court's determination should not be
disturbed. Accordingly, A&K respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's
finding that neither party a prevailed.
DATED:

January p

2012
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
APPEALED: CASE #20110553
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG vs. JERRY WARNICK
CASE NUMBER 080901745 Contracts

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
L A DEVER
PARTIES
Plaintiff- ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Represented by: SAMANTHA J SLARK
Defendant - JERRY WARNICK
Represented by: LARRY G REED
Represented by: BRIAN W STEFFENSEN
Defendant - MARTIN TANNER
Represented by: TAD D DRAPER
Defendant - DAVID THAYNE
Defendant - HERITAGE COMMUNICATIONS INC
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
874.75
Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
BAIL/CASH BONDS Posted:
Forfeited:
0.00
Refunded:
0.00
Balance:
300.00

874.75

300.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT lOK-MORE
Amount Due:
155.00
Amount Paid:
155.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COUNTER 2K-10K
Amount Due:
75.00
Amount Paid:
75.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
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CASE NUMBER 080901745 Contracts

Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER.
06-09-10 Filed: Notice of Hearing sent to Brian Steffensen returned:
Clerk re-sent to forwarding address
06-09-10 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 07-29-2009
06-11-10 Fee Account created
Total Due:
0.75
06-11-10 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
0.75
Note: 1.00 cash tendered.
0.25 change given.
06-14-10 Filed: Motion In Limine to Exclude Evidence or Testimony
Regarding Certain Alleged Representations of Nathan Wilcox or
the Firm and Any Assertions of Fraud or Misrepresentation on
the Part of Nathan Wilcox or the Finn
Filed by: ESHELMAN, JENNIFER R
06-14-10 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion In Limine to Exclude
Evidence or Testimony Regarding Certain Alleged Representations
of Nathan Wilcox or the Firm and Any Assertions of Fraud or
Misrepresentation on the Part of Nathan Wilcox or the Finn
06-16-10 Filed: Transcript, Hearing, July 29,2009; Natalie Lake, CCT
06-28-10 Filed: Motion In Limine to Exclude Evidence and Testimony that
Warnick and Tanner Were Ever Owners of Defendant Heritage
Communications, Inc.
Filed by: DRAPER, TAD D
06-28-10 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion In Limine to Exclude
Evidence and Testimony that Warnich and Tanner Were Ever Owners
of Defendant Heritage Communications, Inc.
06-28-10 Filed: Motion In Limine to Exclude Evidence and Testimony that
there is a Written Agreement or Signed Agreement Between the
Finn and Tanner
Filed by: DRAPER, TAD D
06-28-10 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion In Limine to Exclude
Evidence and Testimony that there is a Written Agreement or
Signed Agreement Between the Firm and Tanner
06-28-10 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Anderson & Karrenberg's:
Motion In Limine to Exclude Evidence or Testimony Regarding
Certain Alleged Representations of Nathan Wilcox or the Firm
and any Assertions of Fraud or Misrepresentation on the Part..
06-28-10 Fee Account created
Total Due:
0.75
06-28-10 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
0.75
Note: 1.00 cash tendered.
0.25 change given.
06-29-10 Filed: Renewed Notice of Change of Address
06-29-10 Filed: Warnick's joinder in Tanner's Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion in Limine
07-02-10 Filed: Trial Witnesses and Exhibits
07-02-10 Filed: Plaintiffs Proposed Voir Dire
07-02-10 Filed: Plaintiffs Proposed Special Verdict Form
07-02-10 Filed: Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions (With Citations)
07-02-10 Filed: Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions (without
citations)
07-05-10 Filed: Jerry Warnick's Proposed Jury Instructions with
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